The purpose of this paper is to define a new notion of local equilibrium in an exchange economy, where the consumers face lower bounds on net trades. Then, we show that the local equilibrium is unique if the lower bounds are closed enough to 0. By the way, we also provides a convergence result of local equilibrium price toward Walras equilibrium price of a suitable linear economy.
Introduction
In an exchange economy, under suitable assumptions on the differentiability of the utility functions, it is well known that equilibrium is generically locally unique (See, for example, [5, 6, 8, 1] ). This local uniqueness means that there exists only one equilibrium in a sufficiently small neighborhood around an equilibrium price.
In this paper, we focus our attention to another approach with a new concept of local equilibrium. Actually, we assume that the consumers do not consider all possible consumptions but only those which are close to the initial endowments. So the net trades on the market remain small. Formally, this means that the consumption set of a consumer is the set of consumptions which are above a given fraction of the initial endowments. We can also interpret this as the fact that the consumers face a restricted market participation where the trades must lie in bounded below subsets depending on endowments with a lower bound close to 0. Then, a local equilibrium is a Walras equilibrium of this economy with restricted consumption sets.
We first study the link between local equilibria and equilibria of a family of linear economies as the tangent linear economies introduced in [4, 3] . The linear economies are defined by the constant marginal utilities of the agents, which are computed using the marginal utilities at the initial endowments.
Since the trades in a local economy converge to 0 when the trades are more and more restricted, we have to rescale them in order to be comparable with the ones of the linear economies. Actually, we show that we can associate to a local economy an auxiliary economy with the same initial endowments, the positive orthant for the consumption sets and new utility functions derived from the original one by a rescaling of the net trade. Then, we show that the equilibria of these auxiliary economies converge to an equilibrium of a linear economy when the scaling factors tend to 0. The limit linear economy depends on the limit of the direction of the lower bounds on the net trades. In particular, this implies that a local equilibrium price is close to the unique equilibrium price of the limit linear economy and the rescaled equilibrium allocations are also close to the equilibrium allocations of the tangent linear economy.
The main contribution of the paper is to show that the local equilibrium price is unique for sufficiently restricted trade when the utility functions are strictly quasi-concave. Obviously, we also have the uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation. The proof is based on a concave representation of preferences and a convexity-like property of the indirect utility functions.
This result can be related to the fact that the Walras equilibrium price is unique when the initial endowments are in a neighborhood of the contract curve or of the set of Pareto optimal allocations (See [1] ). In that case, without any a priori restrictions, the trades are small. So we remain in the same kind of interpretation: the equilibrium is unique when the trades are small, that is when the gains in terms of utility level are closed to the first order linear approximation.
This result also provides a new result about uniqueness of Walras equilibria when the second derivatives of utility functions are close to 0. This generalizes the result of uniqueness for linear exchange economy, where the second derivatives of utility functions are equal to 0.
Consequently, we have two approaches of the local uniqueness of equilibria. Either, as in the literature, we consider a neighborhood of the price and we require that the equilibrium price is unique in this neighborhood or we consider restricted trades, that is equilibrium allocations in a neighborhood of the initial endowments and we have a unique equilibrium price. This paper is a first step toward the definition of a discrete Walrasian exchange process where the exchanges are determined at each period by the unique net trades associated to the unique local equilibrium.
We consider a family of pure exchange economies with commodities and m consumers 1 . The preferences of the agents are represented by utility functions u i from R + to R. The initial endowments are taken in a nonempty compact subset E of (R ++ ) m . So, for an element e = (e i )
, we define a τ -local equilibrium as follows:
The difference with a standard Walras equilibrium comes from the constraint
This constraint means that the consumption set of the consumer is
. One remarks that a τ -local equilibrium is merely a Walras equilibrium of the economy E(e) when τ i = 1 for all i. A τ -local equilibrium is (p * , (e i )), where p * is any non-zero price vector in R + when τ i = 0 for all i.
This constraint x i ≥ (1 − τ i ) e i is equivalent to the constraint on the net trade z i = x i − e i ≥ −τ i e i . So a local equilibrium is an equilibrium with restricted trades, where the maximization problem of a consumer is:
When for all i and for all h τ h i is small , the equilibrium allocation of a τ -local equilibrium is close to e. Indeed, if we combine the lower constraint
We now introduce a family of auxiliary economies (Ê τ (e)) (τ,e) ∈ (]0,1[ ) m ×E and we show the link between a τ -local equilibrium of E(e) and a Walras equilibrium of the auxiliary economyÊ τ (e). The difference between E τ (e) andÊ τ (e) is that we modify the preferences instead of the consumption sets. 1 In R , S denotes the simplex and x = h=1 |x h | for all x ∈ R . The box product is defined as follows: for a pair of vectors (x, y) of R , x y is the vector of R with components x h y h for h = 1, . . . , . We denote by 1 the vector of R the components of which are all equal to 1. 
Note that the coefficient 1/ τ i and the additional term −u i (e i ) are useless in the definition since the preferences are the same with or without them. Nevertheless we use this formulation to emphasize later the convergence towards the tangent linear economy.
We can interpret the preferences of the agent as follows. For two consumptions x i and x i , far from e i , the consumer compares them by considering the two allocations e i + τ i (x i − e i ) and e i + τ i (x i − e i ) which are close to the current allocation e i . So, it is as if the consumer has well known preferences around her initial endowments and extrapolates them for the farther allocations. This can be understood as a limited rationality of the agent or a risk aversion for large trades. Once again, if τ i = 1 for all i, thenÊ τ (e) is merely the initial economy E(e). 
Remark 2.1 We can remark that the definition ofÊ
So, the economies with the utility functions u
or with the utility functionsũ
The next proposition gives the link between τ -local equilibrium of E(e) and Walras equilibrium ofÊ
local equilibrium of the economy E(e).
The proof is obvious starting from the definitions of a Walras equilibrium and τ -local equilibrium.
We now end this section by considering the tangent linear economyÊ ρ 0 (e) associated to E(e) and to a parameter ρ ∈ S m . This follows the approach of [4] . Definition 2.3 If the utility functions are differentiable at the initial endowments e = (e i ), the linear economyÊ ρ 0 (e) is the economy with the consumption sets R + , the initial endowments e i and the linear preferences represented by the utility functionû
Once again, we remark that the preferences are represented by the simpler utility function [ρ i ∇u i (e i )]·x i but we choose such formulation to get simpler statements later.
Convergence of τ -local equilibria
From now on, we consider τ ∈ (]0, is arbitrary chosen in ]0, 1[ to guarantee the compactness of the sets we are considering in the proofs. Recall that E is a compact of (R ++ ) m . We posit the following standard assumption on the preferences in the theory of general economic equilibrium from a differentiable approach.
The following propositions show that the distance between the economieŝ E τ (e) andÊ ρ 0 (e) converges to zero when τ converges uniformly to zero.
The proof of this proposition given in Appendix is a direct consequence of Taylor formula. We deduce from this uniform convergence on compacta a result of continuity (see the proof in Appendix).
Corollary 3.1 Under Assumption C, for all i, the function U from
is continuous. We now deduce the convergence of equilibrium prices and equilibrium allocations.
In the following, we normalize the prices in the simplex S of R . For τ ∈ ]0, 
Proof. Assume on the contrary that there exists ε > 0 such that for all integer ν ≥ 1, there exists τ 
Hencep is not an equilibrium price vector ofÊ ρ 0 (e), so there exists i such thatx i does not belong to the demand forû
Consequently there exists a vector ξ i ∈ R + such thatp · ξ i ≤p · e i and u
. Since according to Assumption C, ∇u i (e i ) 0 and p · e i > 0, we can choose ξ i in such a way thatp · ξ i <p · e i .
For ν large enough, p We now state a result on the convergence of equilibrium allocations. Since there is no uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation for the linear tangent economy, we do not really have a convergence property but a closed graph property. 
, one has u
. From Corollary 3.1, one gets at the limit u , one concludes thatû
Sox i is optimal in the budget set associated top andp · e i . Hence (x i ) is an equilibrium allocation of the economyÊ ρ 0 (e).
Uniqueness of the local equilibrium
The main result of the paper is the following one about the uniform uniqueness of the τ -local equilibrium for initial endowments remaining in a compact subset of (R ++ ) m if the vector τ is uniformly small enough. For this, we need the utility functions to satisfy, in addition to C, the following standard assumption.
Assumption C . For all i, for all x i ∈ R ++ and for all z i ∈ R \ {0}, one has : and for all e ∈ E, the economy E(e) has a unique normalized τ -local equilibrium.
The proof is based on a combination of the concavity of the utility function and a convexity-like property of the indirect utility functions associated to when the vector τ is small enough. This property is known to be satisfied when the utility function is linear (See, [2] ).
In order to prepare this proof, we first recall that we can consider concave utility functions without any loss of generality. Let
We now apply the following lemma (See, [8] is defined by:
Here, we introduce two functions.The first one is denoted by ψ and defined from R to R ++ by:
The second one is denoted by V τ i ie i and defined from R to R by:
Before stating the key lemma on the convexity of V
, we first define a compact subset of potential equilibrium prices. As already noticed, the function (ρ, e) → P 
Q is a compact subset of R . The proof of the following key lemma is given in Appendix. m × E such that the economyÊ τ (e) has two different normalized equilibrium prices p and p . Let (x i ) (resp. (y i )) be the equilibrium allocation associated to p (resp. p ). Let r be the price vector defined by r h = p h p h for h = 1, . . . , . Let q and q be the vectors defined as follows:
, q and q belongs to Q. So we deduce from Lemma 4.2 that for all i,
In addition, one remarks that for all h, ln(r h /r ) =
So, since (x i ) (resp. (y i )) is the equilibrium allocation associated to p (resp. p ), we get, for all i, 1 2ũ
From the definition of A(E) and K, e i +τ i (x i −e i ) and e i +τ i (y i −e i ) belong toK i . Sinceũ
From the definition of the indirect utility function, this implies r·(
The utility function u i being strictly quasi-concave on R ++ by Assumption C', the utility function u
is strictly quasi-concave on R + for all τ i ∈]0; 1[ . So the demand is single valued and the uniqueness of the normalized equilibrium price implies the uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation. Proof. Since the range of X is included in S × A(E), which is bounded, it suffices to show that for all sequence (e
for all i, and 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The Taylor formula applied to u i at e i gives:
Where ξ i ∈ [e i , e i + τ i x i ]. Hence: Then we have:
The last inequality comes from the fact that:
The subset
is a compact subset of R ++ . So M and M defined by: 
From Proposition 3.1, there existsθ > 0 such that: neighborhood ofx and A a neighborhood of (ρ,ē,x). Let (θ, ρ, e, x) ∈ B. If θ i = 0,
If θ i > 0,
Proof of Lemma 4.2
For all p ∈ R ++ and w ≥ 0, one has:
and there exists α ∈ S such that
It suffices to show that for all i, there exists θ i > 0 such that for all τ i ∈ (Γ∩]0; θ i ] ), for all e ∈ E and for all α ∈ S, V τ i e i α is strictly convex on the convex hull of Q, coQ. One then gets the result by taking the minimum of
For all i,Ê i denotes the projection of E on the i-th component of (R ) m . It is a compact subset included in R ++ .
For the sake of simpler notation, we omit the subscript i in the remaining of the proof. Let us compute the Hessian matrix of ]) and for all (e, q) ∈Ê ×coQ , e+τ (ξ −e) remains in a compact set A of R ++ . Hence, the norm of the Hessian matrix of u is bounded above on A and we denote byδ an upper bound. Consequently, for all (e, q, τ ) ∈Ê × coQ × (]0, 
The second inequality comes from the fact that 0 ≤ α h ≤ 1 for all h. We remark that
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, one has Computation of formula (1) Recall that α belongs to the simplex S, q to a compact subset coQ of R + and χ to R . V (2) Note that
and 
